Domination Through Inequality: Separating the Sociopolitical from the Natural

Cristiano Lima

Professor Deo

POLS-397 Domination

11 December 2012

Domination Through Inequality: Separating the Sociopolitical from the Natural

            Every interaction between human beings involves power, regardless of whether or not it is deliberately or consciously exercised. When this power is manipulated and utilized for personal gains, domination occurs. Through this lens Michel Foucault’s conception of power as a pervasive and inescapable tenant of existence holds true. Where this power theory falters is in then postulating that all forms of domination are consequently inevitable for our species. While we may be bound to certain natural inequalities and their resulting behavioral tendencies, we can eradicate the ability to utilize them for coercive means through the implementation of social and political action. Though government itself is inherently a form of domination, it can be used to create a truly egalitarian society by removing the institutionalized inequalities that have been created as a result of the progression of human history. Ultimately, domination through natural inequalities can only be removed through the institutionalized control of government, and the removal of the latter can only resort in the anarchical state of nature in which self-preservation and natural law replace systematic domination. One is thusly sacrificed for the other, making the presence of power an inevitable part of existence. It’s use, however, is wholly dependent upon our implementation of government in society. By postulating the potential to create a form of government that eliminates social and political inequalities we free ourselves from the dismal fate of inescapable domination permeating all aspects of human existence.

To come to a conclusion on the question of whether or not domination is a permanent feature of  human nature we must first provide parameters for this inquiry. Domination is the control of another through the use of power, whether it be direct or indirect. Bachrach and Baratz theorized that it manifested itself through the “faces of power”. The first is the most direct and also the most prevalent on an individual level, where “power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B” (p. 948). This shows how government is inherently a form of domination, in that regardless of what ruling apparatus may be in place, power will ultimately be given to some to be exercised over another. Thomas Hobbes asserted in the Leviathan that individuals renounce their right to self-govern by engaging in the social contract to protect themselves from the state of nature which is consequently removed. The state is given a monopoly on the only just form of power in exchange for peace and order. In doing so we submit ourselves to a form of institutionalized domination that cannot be avoided if the route of state government is chosen.

The second face of power is more overt and takes place when A silences B by disallowing their opinions and interests to be considered in the decision making process. This form of domination is the most susceptible where participation in decision making is skewed by power relations, as was observed by John Gaventa in Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley. In this case the local media, which was heavily influenced by the local power dynamics, served to silence the plight of the miners who were in search of better treatment and representation. Even more concerning was the effect of the third face of power on these miners. The third face, introduced by Gaventa, is the least tangible and often the most difficult to identify,  as social constructs create a self reinforcing ideology that perpetuates the power of the elite. In the Appalachian Valley this resulted in the “active opposition by the membership to a movement for greater participation, equality and militance within their organization” (Gaventa p.166). The third face of power is most dangerous in a form of government where direct oppression is not apparent, because social constructs are much more difficult to comprehend and equally as susceptible to power dynamics. Through these means domination manifests itself.

The three faces of power illuminate how domination in civil society often occurs indirectly, and how the powerful within any given society will manipulate the system to create a self-reinforcing cycle of power that serves their own interests. It also shows how the individual and the collective are constantly at odds, and how government is used to mediate this tension. Because of this man’s natural self and the sociopolitical institutions he created are always on conflicting ends, with the former seeking to utilize the latter to moderate disputes of power.    Reinhold Niebuhr saw this tension as impossible to overcome and argued that coercion was not only inevitable but a necessary part of human nature. He argued in Moral Man Immoral Society that coercion was necessary to establish order and peace, and that as a result it “seriously complicates the whole task of securing both peace and justice” (p. 20). Peace, in this regard equated with accepted order, is much simpler to attain than justice and lack of domination. The third face of power could be used to maintain a society in which domination is pervasive, apparent, yet accepted, while all three could serve to create it. This refutes James Scott’s assertion that ideological hegemony essentially does not exist, since domination is internalized to varying extents, with complete hegemonic subjugation an extreme yet attainable outcome. To achieve a just and egalitarian society, we must search for the roots of our inequalities that result in these self-perpetuating power dynamics to prevent a state of unaware and persistent domination.

Jean Jacques Rousseau argued that “the history of human illness could easily be written by following that of civil societies”(p.110). In saying so he asserts that as a consequence of our attempts to instill order in society we have forsaken justice and allowed for coercive use of power to manifest itself. In other words, “organization is the mobilization of bias” (Schattschneider, p. 71). Rousseau’s assertion also implies that prior to civil society human ills were much lesser as a result of this more natural self. The transformation from noble savage to modern civil societies precipitated a change in the types of inequalities that determined a human being’s ability to survive, changing from natural to sociopolitical. In doing so, it also ushered in the age of institutionalized unjust domination in favor of political order. Rousseau characterizes this essential differentiation of inequalities as follows:

“I conceive of two sorts of inequality in the human species: one, which I call natural or physical, because it is established by nature and consists of the difference of ages, health, bodily strengths, and qualities of mind or soul; the other, which may be called moral or political inequality, because it depends upon a sort of convention and is established, or at least authorized, by the consent of men.” (p. 101)

By distinguishing between natural and political inequalities we can assert that the latter has come to exist as a result of the former. We can further conclude that all sociopolitical inequalities have come into existence as a result of different developmental contexts, and that our varying implementations of institutionalized inequalities dictate the existence of political inequalities in the world. Any cultural, political, or societal practices will yield different resulting equalities and inequalities, and from these stem our ability to assert power over one another. In modern history, “the static inequalities of an agrarian society were transmuted into the dynamic inequalities of an industrial age,” (Children of Light Children of Darkness, p. 22-23) thus allowing us to be the agent of change with regards to power relations and domination.

As previously noted, natural inequality is definitively an inescapable part of our physical existence. Sociopolitical inequalities, however, are not, as they are a result of our choices and practices as a collective. Because of this, how we construct our societies and their institutions ultimately determines the extent to which domination occurs within them. Michel Foucault’s conception of pervasive inescapable power is thusly tempered by the recognition that power is derived from inequality, and the sociopolitical inequalities described by Rousseau are dynamic and changeable.

The subset of natural or physical inequalities expressed by Rousseau are characterized by “difference of ages, health, bodily strengths, and qualities of mind or soul” (p. 101). To this list we can add three further variables into the discussion: gender, ethnicity, and race. Gender is the most fundamental of all natural human inequalities, with sexuality as its main sociopolitical counterpart. Our views on the sexuality become socialized and institutionalized to create sociopolitical inequalities that limit our ability to engage in a society free from the oppressive stigmas of and impositions on gender. This does not mean, however, that only genderless species, such as the one exhibited in Ursula Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness, have potential access to gender equality, and consequently the eradication of societal male subjugation.

Any species that procreates through bonding pairs exhibits differences either anatomically, behaviorally or both. If anatomical differences are merely correlated with behavioral ones and no causality can be drawn then it is a clear and evident case of a sociopolitical inequality. The biological need for two distinctive genders does not necessarily preclude inherent inequalities in social hierarchy, though. Frans De Waals’ study of bonobos and chimpanzees in Our Inner Ape elucidates this by revealing how the differing gender relations and their practices resulted (in one case) in extremely high gender equality. The matriarchal society produced by bonobo socialization practices created a much more egalitarian society than our own, which more closely mirrored the warring patriarchal individualism of the chimpanzees. The contrast between the chimpanzees, the bonobos, and ourselves can be largely derived from natural or physical inequalities. Males in both the human and chimpanzee species tend to be stronger, bigger, and faster than their female counterparts, whereas the disparity in size and physical ability between bonobo males and females is significantly smaller. The disparity in these natural and physical abilities in chimpanzee society results in increased power and ability to assert one’s power over another through exercise in domination.

From these species we can also observe that there is a strong correlation between gender inequality, patriarchy and hierarchy. Similar to human beings “among chimpanzees, hierarchy permeates everything” (De Waal, p. 56).  For both groups hierarchal status is pivotal in determining one’s ability to survive and/or procreate, with the greatest difference being that that of the modern human is predicated significantly less on natural abilities but rather the sociopolitical impositions implemented by government and society. Furthermore, “power is the prime mover of the male chimpanzee” (De Waal, p. 46), but he may not be alone. The overwhelming tendency of patriarchal societies across species to be one of competition perpetuates the common view of the male tendency toward war and physical domination. Le Guin’s depiction of a fictional world in which gender neutrality results in the societal absence of major scale violence further substantiates this claim. This male tendency toward violence and domination perhaps stems from the biological need to procreate itself, as a submissive male under certain socialization practices may lead to an extinct species. Regardless of its evolutionary implications, this study shows us that gender is the source of various inherent inequalities that result in the oppressive manipulation of power.

One of the most important implications of gender in analyzing species behavior is the role of child bearing and procreation. Frans De Waal notes that “every human society has nuclear families, whereas apes have none” (p. 94). Females are inherently limited by the concept of bonding pairs confined to the nuclear family unit. In this model they are restricted to relational fidelity more than the male, since they are biologically restricted to a single mate during procreation. In the Second Treatise of Government philosopher Jean Locke makes the claim that “the society of man and wife should be more lasting, than of male and female amongst other creatures; that so their industry might be encouraged, and their interest better united” since they are “tied to a longer conjunction”(p.43-44) of childbearing. Unlike the bonobo society, single human bonding pairs are tasked with child bearing of their own offspring until the child is able to adequately sustain themselves. The combination of length of child bearing and the societal imposition of fidelity coalesce to the effect of inevitably forming a patriarchal society in which the males are able to exercise inordinate levels of control over the females. This is emblematic of a natural inequality that only becomes oppressive through sociopolitical practices.

The bonobos, on the other hand, have almost entirely done away with this issue by tasking the collective with the child bearing of offspring. In doing so they removed the impetus of male dominance and created a more just egalitarian society. Human beings are capable of adopting such practices which might address such an issue. A similar such child bearing system was evident in the fictional society of Orgereyn from The Left Hand of Darkness, which utilized the state to separate children and parents at an early age, thereby establishing a complete meritocracy. The common factor in these two systems is the lack of possessiveness of children resulting in more freedom from control for all genders following reproduction. While gender neutrality is obviously not a solution to our tendency to dominate, the shared child bearing practices of these two societies, one primate and one fictional, lead us to believe that it is possible to deal with these issues in spite of gender differences. A model for this is outlined by Ian Shapiro, who argues that a customizable marriage system backed by social and economic reforms to instill equality would minimize much of male domination in society.

The hierarchal tendency of age is a troubling one, even for the bonobos, in that the natural inequality of age results in the quandary of how to govern maturing offspring. Ian Shapiro argues in Democratic Justice that since children are not fully developed cognitively that parents must take up the fiduciary role of representing their best interests, which is mediated by the state’s imposed impetus of basic interest. This perfectly illustrates the constant tension between the individual and the collective as previously described by Reinhold Niebuhr. In this example hierarchy is inevitable, but the ways in which it is converted into law often times oversteps its bounds and generates unjust control. The French conception of majorité, which requires an individual to become eighteen years of age to establish citizenship, is exemplary of a natural inequality that is institutionalized in a way that creates unnecessary domination over a group.

We now return to the final two variables of physical inequality: ethnicity and race. Some of the most oppressive and intolerable acts of domination in human history have been committed on the basis of race and ethnicity. These factors, which have as little to do with genetic variation as nonsensical differentiators such as hair color, due to their physical nature are often used to separate and differentiate people, resulting in subjugation and assertion of control. In John Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians perceived differences between citizens of “the Empire” and “the barbarians” resulted in a staunch disdain of one another and an gaping socioeconomic disparity between groups. In this society the effectiveness of Gaventa’s third face of power was so extreme that the assertion of control became irremovably internalized by a vast majority of its citizens. The only identifiable exception to his was the nameless narrator, who struggled to cope with the arbitrary nature of his position of power. What the narrator was recognizing in the barbarians was the concept of sameness of body. This principle transcends all inequalities, whether natural or physical, in favor of a universal equality that connects us all. While Foucault see this sameness of body as a means for control, it can instead be used as the singular basis and justification for creating a truly egalitarian and just government aware of the presence of power but ultimately free of countless oppressive forms of institutionalized control.

De Waal astutely recognizes the following:

“Egalitarianism is not based on mutual love and even less on passivity. It’s an actively maintained condition that recognizes the universal human desire to control and dominate. Instead of denying will to power, egalitarians know it all too well.” (p.78)

In hypothesizing the potential for an egalitarian society we do not dismiss the pervasive nature of power, as depicted by Foucault, but rather recognize that power must be tempered through free agency of the individual and the collective aimed at equal and just ends.

The proposed pragmatic approach toward ending evitable facets of domination is wholly based of idealistic principles of ultimate equality and justice. It is not necessarily evolutionary nor revolutionary, but rather fundamentally instrumental in bringing about en egalitarian society. “When political philosopher Thomas Hobbes postulated an insuppressible power drive, he was right on target for both humans and apes” (De Waal, p. 54), but what he did not account for was the human ability to compensate for its inherent oppressive tendencies through positive sociopolitical implementation. Through our history we have shown that we are capable of distancing ourselves from these natural inequalities by compensating in other realms of life. To this point in has created an imperfect society in which natural inequalities are merely replaced with sociopolitical inequalities. By deconstructing social institutions and deriving whether they produce truly just and equal ends we are able to discern what factors perpetuate domination and assertion of control. In doing so we equip ourselves with the necessary knowledge to differentiate between the natural and the sociopolitical and to eradicate the domination resulting from transmuted inequality.

Works Cited:

1. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Roger D. Masters, and Judith R. Masters.The First and Second Discourses. New York: St. Martin’s, 1964. Print.
2. Our Inner Ape: A Leading Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We Are. New York: Riverhead, 2006. Print.
3. Stone, Clarence. “1. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. “Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review 56 (December): 947–52. “American Political Science Review 100.04 (2006): n. pag. Print.
4. Locke, John, and C. B. Macpherson. Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1980. Print.
5. Niebuhr, Reinhold. Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001. Print.
6. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage, 1995. Print.
7. Niebuhr, Reinhold. The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2011. Print.
8. Shapiro, Ian. Democratic Justice. New Haven, Conn.: Yale UP, 1999. Print.
9. Gaventa, John. Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1982. Print.
10. Bloom, Harold. Ursula K. LeGuin’s The Left Hand of Darkness. New York [u.a.: Chelsea House Publ., 1987. Print.
11. Coetzee, J. M. Waiting for the Barbarians. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1982. Print.
12. Schattschneider, E. E. The Semi-Sovereign People. New York, 1969. p. 71. Print.